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I. INTRODUCTION: ANTITRUST ON TWO-SIDED 
PLATFORMS 
In Ohio v. American Express Co. (“Amex”),1 the Supreme 
Court had its first explicit opportunity to apply antitrust’s 
rule of reason to an allegedly anticompetitive practice on a 
two-sided platform. The writ of certiorari petition asked the 
Court to consider “how Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which 
bans unreasonable restraints of trade, applies to ‘two-sided’ 
 
* James B. Dinan University Professor, Penn Law and the Wharton 
School, University of Pennsylvania. Thank you to Dennis Carlton, Harry 
First, Irving Scher, and Erik Hovenkamp for comments. A version of this 
paper was delivered at the William Howard Taft Lecture, September 14, 
2018, to the New York State Bar Association, Antitrust Law Section.  
© 2018. Herbert Hovenkamp. All rights reserved. 
1 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
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platforms that unite distinct customer groups.”2 The 
challenge was to a vertical interbrand restraint,3 intended to 
prevent merchants from steering customers away from 
American Express (“Amex”) and toward lower cost credit 
cards.4 The suit was originally brought during the Obama 
administration by the Antitrust Division and seventeen 
states.5 The government won in the district court,6 but the 
decision was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit.7 The 2016 presidential election 
intervened, and the United States, under the new 
administration did not seek certiorari, but eleven states who 
had been co-plaintiffs did.8 After certiorari was granted, 
though, the United States filed a brief on behalf of the 
plaintiffs.9 
Careful fact-finding is essential to the rational 
administration of antitrust under the rule of reason. Under 
antitrust’s per se rule, once a practice is shown to fall within 
a certain classification, such as naked price fixing, little 
additional evidence of anticompetitive effects is relevant and 
defenses are limited.10 By contrast, proper application of the 
 
2 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 
(No. 16-1454). 
3 A vertical interbrand restraint, such as exclusive dealing, tying, or 
most favored nation requirements, consists of limitations on the way that a 
dealer can promote or sell a brand other than the one owned by the firm 
imposing the restraint. By contrast, an intrabrand restraint, such as resale 
price maintenance or a territorial limitation, is a restraint on the disposition 
of the imposing firm’s own brand. 
4 See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct at 2280.  
5 See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143 (E.D.N.Y. 
2015), rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express 
Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
6 Id. at 238–39. 
7 United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 207 (2d Cir. 2016), 
aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
8 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2. 
9 Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioners, 
Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (No. 16-1454). 
10 See 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 
1509 (4th ed. 2017). 
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rule of reason requires a searching and detailed factual 
examination and careful development of a record, enabling the 
court to understand the structure and economic effects of the 
defendant’s activities.11 This in turn obliges appellate courts 
to review the record developed in the district court. The 
Supreme Court’s Amex opinion should be tested against this 
requirement. 
A significant portion of the debate among the various 
courts and the Supreme Court majority and dissenters 
concerned the way market power and anticompetitive effects 
should be measured. Therefore, it is essential to consider what 
it means that this dispute took place on a “two-sided” 
platform. Although some people speak of two-side markets, 
that term creates some confusion when used in juxtaposition 
with the term “relevant market” in antitrust. As both the 
majority and the dissent made clear, the fact that a platform 
is two-sided does not entail that it should be treated as a 
single relevant market for antitrust purposes.12 Indeed, 
because they lack market power, many platforms are not 
relevant markets even if both sides are considered. 
Many firms sell complementary products, and often to 
different groups of buyers, but that fact alone does not make 
them two-sided platforms. Rather, a two-sided platform is a 
business that depends on relationships between two different, 
noncompeting groups of transaction partners.13 A traditional 
example is the printed periodical, such as a newspaper, which 
earns revenue by selling both advertising and subscriptions to 
the paper itself. Depending on the chosen business model, 
 
11 See id. ¶ 1507 (tracking factual allegations and proof burdens in rule 
of reason cases). 
12 Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct at 2285–86; id. at 2300–01 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting).  
13 The classic treatment of two-sided markets can be found in Jean-
Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 
1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 990 (2003). On definitional problems, see generally 
Michael Katz & Jonathan Sallet, Multisided Platforms and Antitrust 
Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 2142 (2018). Many of the issues were initially 
raised in William F. Baxter, Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper: 
Legal and Economic Perspectives, 26 J.L. & ECON. 541 (1983). 
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such a periodical might obtain very different mixtures of 
advertising and subscriber revenue. At one extreme, 
Consumer Reports does not sell advertising but derives its 
revenue entirely from subscriptions and donations.14 At the 
other extreme, the local neighborhood shopping flier might be 
distributed free to customers, with its production and 
distribution supported entirely by advertising revenues. The 
manager of a two-sided platform maximizes profits by coming 
up with the optimal mixture of participation and revenue on 
the two sides. 
Two-sided platform sellers can be harmed by feedback 
effects if they make the wrong choice on one side of their 
platform. For example, a magazine might keep its user 
subscription price low by relying on relatively more 
advertising, but this may cause subscribers to cancel their 
subscriptions due to excessive advertising. As this happens, 
the magazine will become less attractive to advertisers, 
leading to a vicious cycle of revenue loss on both sides. The 
trick for the magazine is to find the “sweet spot” that 
optimizes revenue between paid subscribers and paid 
advertisers. Such an optimized allocation is a consequence not 
merely of the price level on the two sides of the platform, but 
also of the amount of participation on each – that is, of 
appropriate “participation balanc[ing].”15 This spot, once 
achieved, is also an equilibrium for that firm.16 That is, it has 
 
14 See About Us, CONSUMER REP., https://www.consumerreports.org/ 
cro/about-us/support-our-work/index.htm [https://perma.cc/L75W-HQ9R]. 
15 See Erik Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust, 44 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 
2019) (manuscript at 11–13), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3219396 [https://perma.cc/5UFG-92XT]; see also Dennis W. 
Carlton, The Anticompetitive Effects of Vertical Most-Favored-Nation 
Restraints and the Error of Amex, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 93, 101 (2019) 
(“The insight of Rochet and Tirole is that a two-sided market has the 
property that the price to each side of the market matters separately. That 
is, it is not only the sum of the prices that matters but also the relative 
prices on each side of the market.”) (citing Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean 
Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 37 RAND J. ECON. 645 
(2006)). Identifying and reaching this sweet spot is sometimes called 
“participation balancing.” See Hovenkamp, supra at 12–14. 
16 See Hovenkamp, supra note 15, at 13. 
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no reason to change the balance as long as circumstances 
remain the same. Of course, if something changes that 
balance—such as a large postage rate increase for magazine 
subscribers—then the firm may have to seek out a new 
equilibrium. Significantly, not only the aggregate level of fees, 
but also their distribution determines the point that 
maximizes the platform operator’s profits.17 The Second 
Circuit seemed to ignore this attribute of platforms in Amex, 
when it spoke of the network’s profitability as determined by 
the “net price” of using the Amex card but said nothing about 
participation balancing.18 The same net price might yield very 
different levels of output and profits depending on how the 
price is distributed between the two sides. 
In the platform literature, the term “indirect” network 
effects describes situations in which the value of the platform 
to one side depends on either the revenue generated or the 
number of users on the other side.19 For example, ride-hailing 
platforms such as Uber can succeed only if they have a critical 
volume of drivers on one side and a critical number of 
passengers on the other side.20 If fares are set too high, the 
number of passengers will fall off. If they are set too low, the 
number of drivers will fall off. Ongoing antitrust litigation 
alleges that Uber is facilitating price fixing among drivers 
because its platform computes fares that are the same for 
similar rides.21 But platform economics suggests otherwise. 
The situation is more similar to the one in Broadcast Music, 
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (“BMI”), a 1979 
 
17 See generally Rochet & Tirole, supra notes 13, 15. See also Dennis W. 
Carlton & Ralph A. Winter, Vertical Most-Favored-Nation Restraints and 
Credit Card No-Surcharge Rules, 61 J.L. & ECON. 215, 236 (2018); 
Hovenkamp, supra note 15, at 11–12. 
18 See United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 203 (2d Cir. 
2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
19 See generally Rochet & Tirole, supra note 15 ; see also DAVID S. EVANS 
& RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MATCHMAKERS: THE NEW ECONOMICS OF 
MULTISIDED PLATFORMS 25 (2016). 
20 See Hovenkamp, supra note 15, at 4, 9. 
21 See Meyer v. Kalanick, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817, 820–21 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); 
see also infra notes 173–76 and accompanying text. 
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Supreme Court decision that also involved a two-sided 
platform, although the Court did not identify it as such.22 In 
BMI, the Court considered whether nonexclusive licenses, 
granted by owners of recorded music and assembled by the 
defendant into a “blanket license” granting nonexclusively to 
broadcasters, amounted to unlawful price fixing by the 
copyright owners.23 The Court held that this practice was not 
unlawful, because petitioners’ blanket licenses were a highly 
valuable product that could be assembled only by the 
cooperation of the participating artists.24 The parallels to the 
Uber case are quite strong. 
The fact that a platform has two sides does not necessarily 
mean that both sides are positive contributors of revenue. It 
is important to distinguish between the revenue level, which 
is the aggregate price, and the revenue distribution, which is 
how the price is divided up among participants on the two 
sides.25 Sometimes the price to users on one side of the 
platform is zero. For example, traditional “free” over-the-air 
television is supported entirely by paid advertising. Viewers 
pay nothing for program access. This is also the case for most 
consumer web search engines, such as Google Search, Bing, 
and Yahoo, and social networking sites such as Facebook. 
These services are generally free to users, but are supported 
by advertising revenue.26 Nevertheless, those advertising 
revenues still depend on the number of users or the number 
of page views. 
In some cases, as in Amex itself, the revenue from one side 
can be negative.27 Credit card companies routinely charge 
 
22 Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
23 Id. at 8–9 (assuming that the artists were “literally” fixing prices). 
24 Id. at 20–21, 24. 
25 See Hovenkamp, supra note 15, at 11–12. 
26 Some social networking sites, such as LinkedIn, also have a 
“premium” version for which users pay a monthly fee. See LinkedIn 
Premium, LINKEDIN, https://premium.linkedin.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/LD7E-VWSJ]. 
27 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2274, 2281 (2018); see also 
United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 203 n.36 (E.D.N.Y. 
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merchants acceptance fees for the use of the cards, while the 
cost to customers can be zero or even negative depending on 
the terms of customer card ownership.28 A typical card might 
charge no annual fee to customers, and no usage fees other 
than interest on unpaid balances or penalties for late 
payments. In addition, the card may award “perks” or other 
inducements that make the cost of the credit card negative to 
the consumer. These can include favorable treatment such as 
airline travel miles, extended warranties on products 
purchased with the card, or increased insurance protection for 
vehicles rented on the card.29 That was largely the case with 
Amex’s card offerings: many of the company’s cardholders 
paid nothing for ownership of the card but received perks for 
each purchase made with it.30 As a result, it was actually 
cheaper to use the card than to pay cash. Significantly, as the 
district court noted but the Supreme Court majority 
overlooked, these perks are granted for card use, not simply 
for card ownership.31 For example, consumers do not receive 
product purchase protection simply because they happen to 
carry an Amex card in their wallet; they must actually use the 
card to make the qualifying purchase.32 
Some so-called “transactional” platforms, including credit 
card networks and ride-hailing apps, exhibit a very direct 
 
2015) rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express 
Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
28 The process is described in Steven Semeraro, Settlement Without 
Consent: Assessing the Credit Card Merchant Fee Class Action, 2015 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 186, 196 (2015). See generally Dany H. Assaf & Rebecca 
Moskowitz, Global Credit Card Wars: Litigation, Legislation, or Innovation 
as a Path to Peace, 29 ANTITRUST 42 (2015). 
29 See, e.g., infra note 30. 
30 Current perks for various classes of American Express credit cards 
are summarized at Retail and Travel Benefits, AM. EXPRESS, 
https://www.americanexpress.com/us/credit-cards/features-
benefits/policies/index.html [https://perma.cc/P7SJ-P59T]. 
31 See Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 191. 
32 See, e.g., Purchase Protection, AM. EXPRESS, 
https://www.americanexpress.com/us/credit-cards/features-
benefits/policies/purchase-protection/faq.html#5 [https://perma.cc/P3TZ-
9PMW] (limiting purchase protection to goods purchased with Amex card). 
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relationship between transactions on one side and those on 
the other.33 The Supreme Court emphasized this in its 
peculiar approach to market definition.34 For example, each 
time a customer uses an Amex card to make a purchase, the 
platform simultaneously logs one transaction on the customer 
side and an equal and offsetting transaction on the merchant 
side, less Amex’s merchant acceptance fee.35 The same thing 
is true of Uber.36 Each time a passenger hails a ride, the 
passenger pays the fare through the Uber application and the 
driver is compensated accordingly, after Uber subtracts its 
fee. This one-to-one transactional correspondence does not 
apply to all two-sided platforms. Health insurance networks, 
newspapers, search engines, and streaming sites, for example, 
exhibit a less direct relationship between transactions on the 
two sides of the market. In a market such as free television, 
advertising volume and rates might be based on Nielsen or 
other surveys that assess the size and composition of the 
audience.37 Advertising rates on a search engine such as 
Google are often based on clicks, which means that more 
heavily used search engines generate more advertising 
 
33 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2280 (2018) (citing 
Benjamin Klein, Andres V. Lerner, Kevin M. Murphy & Lacey L. Plache, 
Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Antitrust Economics of Payment 
Card Interchange Fees, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 571, 580, 583 (2006)). 
34 See infra notes 82–86 and accompanying text. 
35 See id. 
36 See Brief of the International Air Transport Association and Airlines 
for America as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 5–6, Am. Express 
Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (No. 16–1454). 
37 See Advertising Effectiveness, NIELSEN, https://www.nielsen.com/ 
us/en/solutions/advertising-effectiveness.html [https://perma.cc/TLL5-
63FX]; see also United States v. Gray Television, Inc., No. 1:15-CV-02232, 
2016 WL 1064377, at *10–11 (D.D.C. Mar. 3, 2016) (noting how television 
advertising rates are computed from Nielsen ratings based on audience size 
and demographic characteristics). Some pay television contains advertising 
as well, and Nielsen data may also be used to compute ad rates for such 
products. See, e.g., Dish Enlists Nielsen Digital Measurement to Power 
Advanced Advertising Across Sling TV, NIELSEN (Sept. 20, 2018), 
https://www.nielsen.com/us/en/press-room/2018/dish-enlists-nielsen-
digital-measurement-to-power-advanced-ads-across-sling.html 
[https://perma.cc/CM2W-CL93]. 
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revenue.38 The volume and price of advertising is certainly 
affected by these measures of traffic, but it is hardly true that 
a one-to-one correspondence exists between a viewer’s activity 
and the purchase of advertising.  
The antitrust challenge in Amex was to an “antisteering” 
rule that Amex imposed upon merchants accepting its credit 
cards.39 Amex charges merchants an acceptance fee, typically 
a percentage of the transaction price, that can run much 
higher than the fee charged by competing credit card issuers 
such as Visa, Mastercard, and Discover.40 Many customers 
who carry the Amex card likely also carry one or more other 
cards.41 This incentivizes the merchant to induce the 
customer to use a less costly card, which it might do by 
offering the customer a product price discount or other 
compensation if she agrees to switch. For example, if the 
merchant acceptance fee on a large purchase is thirty dollars 
with an Amex card, but only twenty dollars with a Visa card, 
the merchant might wish to offer the customer a price 
discount of six dollars for using the Visa card rather than 
Amex. Alternatively, it might offer free delivery or some other 
valuable good or service. The antisteering rule prevents the 
merchant from making this offer, or even from informing the 
customer that the Amex card was more costly to use.42 The 
rule does not apply to transactions that do not use a card at 
all, such as payment by cash or checks, and it does not apply 
 
38 For a summary of how these alternatives compute advertising rates, 
see generally Web Tracking Solutions, L.L.C. v. Google, Inc., No. 08-CV-
03139, 2011 WL 3418323 (E.D.N.Y. July 27, 2011) (providing the magistrate 
judge’s report and recommendation); see also Nathan Newman, Search, 
Antitrust, and the Economics of the Control of User Data, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 
401, 413–14 (2014). 
39 See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct at 2280. 
40 The district court found that Amex maintained higher merchant 
acceptance fees than rival cards, although the difference had been declining. 
United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 200 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), 
rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 
138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). The differences tended to be higher in purchases 
involving airlines, rental cars, and lodging. Id. 
41 See id. at 178. 
42 Id. at 165. 
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to debit cards.43 The government alleged that the antisteering 
rule effectively forced customers to stay with the higher priced 
card, thus increasing not only merchant fees, but also product 
prices indirectly.44 Visa and Mastercard also used their own 
versions of such provisions, but signed consent judgments 
agreeing to abandon the practice.45 
“Steering” is fundamental to competition of any kind, 
including competition among platforms. It offers market 
participants an incentive to seek out lower cost alternatives. 
Some platforms are “single-homing,” which means that users 
typically engage with only one platform.46 For example, 
smartphones are costly, and managing two different phones 
would be inconvenient. For that reason, most smartphone 
users have only a single phone at a time. iPhone users 
purchase their apps on the App Store, and Android users 
purchase them on Google Play. Competition for a particular 
user exists for the platform—the smartphone itself—rather 
than among platform incumbents. Credit cards are different, 
however. They readily accommodate “multi-homing.”47 
Cardholders often own two or more general purpose credit 
cards and use whichever satisfies them most for a particular 
transaction. The same is true of ride hailing services, web 
browsers, and computer search engines. Competition among 
 
43 Id. 
44 See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct at 2288–89. As the Supreme Court 
described the antisteering rule, it prohibits: 
. . . merchants from implying a preference for non-Amex 
cards; dissuading customers from using Amex cards; 
persuading customers to use other cards; imposing any 
special restrictions, conditions, disadvantages, or fees on 
Amex cards; or promoting other cards more than Amex. The 
antisteering provisions do not, however, prevent merchants 
from steering customers toward debit cards, checks, or cash. 
Id. at 2283. 
45 See id. at 2293 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Am. 
Express Co., No. 10–CV–4496, 2011 WL 2974094, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 20, 
2011) (approving proposed consent judgment, 75 Fed. Reg. 62858–02 (Oct. 
13, 2010)). 
46 See Hovenkamp, supra note 15, at 18–19. 
47 See Hovenkamp, supra note 15, at 17. 
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platforms can help ensure competitive prices and high-quality 
service, but an antisteering rule, such as Amex’s, eliminates a 
consumer’s incentive to use the least costly alternative. 
The credit card steering problem presents some analogies 
to the existing economic literature on cartels. Limitations on 
price competition encourage firms to compete in ways other 
than price. For example, although cartel members may be 
forbidden from cutting the nominal price, they may compete 
with one another on nonprice terms, such as by offering perks 
that may be equivalent to those offered for credit card use.48 
At the margin, the cartel members may throw in nonprice 
perks right up to the point that their costs equal the price 
level. For example, if the competitive price is ten dollars but 
the cartel price is fourteen dollars, the cartel members may 
end up competing against one another by including nonprice 
perks costing them up to four dollars. Even apart from cartels, 
however, mixtures of price and nonprice competition are 
ubiquitous.  
Steering facilitates both price and nonprice competition by 
permitting merchants to reward cardholders for using less 
costly forms of payment. Card issuers can compete either by 
cutting their merchant acceptance fee or by increasing their 
perks. With steering, merchants can permit customers to 
choose between a lower product price obtained by using a card 
with a lower acceptance fee, or a higher-price product 
purchased with a card that rewards the customer with higher 
perks. An antisteering rule deprives customers of the 
opportunity to make this choice, at least among alternative 
credit cards. In the process, it serves to blunt both price and 
nonprice competition. 
Some Amex cardholders place greater value on the perks 
than others—a point that the Amex majority overlooked. It 
assumed that the higher transaction fees are justified by 
increased perks, as if they conferred the same value to 
 
48 See generally George J. Stigler, Price and Non-Price Competition, 76 
J. POL. ECON. 149 (1968). On application to transactions and merchant 
credit card fees, see Carlton & Winter, supra note 17, at 218, 230. See also 
In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 2015) (treating 
a rise in non-price competition as evidence of collusion). 
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everyone. The very fact that steering worked, however, 
indicates that at least some Amex customers preferred the 
lower product price rather than the perks. Were that not true, 
a steering rule would not have been necessary. 
This Article considers how antitrust’s rule of reason should 
be applied to an exclusionary practice on a platform market. 
It considers the rule of reason’s basic burden-shifting 
framework, unique elements of market delineation on 
platform markets and the relevance of placing production 
complements into the same “market.” It also considers the 
Court’s regressive, antieconomic conclusion on a proposition 
that was never briefed—whether a market definition is 
necessary in an antitrust challenge to a vertical practice. Then 
it considers the Court’s odd treatment of free rider problems. 
It also faults the Court for paying so little attention to the 
record, its lack of economic analysis, and in particular its 
confusion of total with marginal harms and benefits. Finally, 
it looks at the implications of the Court’s decision for market 
delineation in cases involving platforms. 
II. THE AMEX CASE IN THE SUPREME COURT 
In Amex, the Supreme Court dismissed the government’s 
challenge to the Amex antisteering rule,49 affirming the 
Second Circuit’s decision reversing the district court. The 
Supreme Court acknowledged that antitrust’s rule of reason 
involves a “three-step, burden-shifting framework[.]”50 First, 
the plaintiff must show “that the challenged restraint has a 
substantial anticompetitive effect that harms consumers in 
the relevant market.”51 If the plaintiff carries this burden, 
“then the burden shifts to the defendant to show a 
procompetitive rationale[.]”52 If this showing is successful, 
“then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate 
that the procompetitive efficiencies could be reasonably 
 
49 Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2290. 
50 Id. at 2284.  
51 Id. (citations omitted). 
52 Id. (citations omitted). 
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achieved through less anticompetitive means.”53 Because the 
dissenters agreed with this verbal formulation of the rule of 
reason, it appears to have the unanimous support of the 
Court.54 The differences lay mainly in how the prima facie 
case must be made out and how market power is to be 
established. 
The Court concluded that the government did not carry its 
burden at the first stage. It observed that anticompetitive 
effects could be shown in two ways—either “directly,” by 
“‘proof of actual detrimental effects on competition,’”55 which 
could include “reduced output, increased prices, or decreased 
quality in the relevant market[.]”56 It could also be shown 
“indirectly,” by “proof of market power plus some evidence 
that the challenged restraint harms competition.”57 As the 
dissent observed, both of these descriptions were inconsistent 
with traditionally accepted requirements under the rule of 
reason. First, “direct” proof of actual detrimental effects does 
not require a market definition;58 however, the majority spoke 
of direct evidence of “reduced output, increased prices, or 
decreased quality in the relevant market” as if it did.59 As 
Justice Stephen Breyer noted in his dissent, “[o]ne critical 
point that the majority’s argument ignores is that proof of 
 
53 Id. 
54 See id. at 2290 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I agree with the majority 
and the parties that this case is properly evaluated under the three-step 
‘rule of reason’[.]”). 
55 Id. at 2284 (quoting FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460 
(1986)). 
56 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
57 Id. (citing Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 97 (2d 
Cir. 1998); Spanish Broad. Sys. of Fla. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 376 
F.3d 1065, 1073 (11th Cir. 2004)). 
58 E.g., 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & JOHN L. SOLOW, 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶521 (4th ed. 2014); Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define 
Markets, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437 (2010). 
59 Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2284. The Court cited FTC v. Ind. 
Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986), but that decision never spoke of 
relevant market. 
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actual adverse effects on competition is, a fortiori, proof of 
market power.”60 The dissent continued: 
The District Court’s findings of actual anticompetitive 
harm from the nondiscrimination provisions thus 
showed that, whatever the relevant market might be, 
American Express had enough power in that market 
to cause that harm. There is no reason to require a 
separate showing of market definition and market 
power under such circumstances. And so the 
majority’s extensive discussion of market definition is 
legally unnecessary.61 
Second, the Court’s formulation of “indirect” proof as 
requiring “proof of market power plus some evidence that the 
challenged restraint harms competition”62 resembles the 
general case for competitive harm under the rule of reason, 
but misses the point of “indirect” proof, which is that it draws 
inferences of market power from a market share and other 
features of a properly defined relevant market. 
In Amex, the plaintiff had relied on direct proof, which 
would not ordinarily require a market definition. As discussed 
below, however, the Court held that for vertical cases such as 
this one, even direct proof required a market definition.63 The 
Court then concluded that the relevant market consists of 
both sides of the platform as “the area of effective 
competition.”64 For example, firms such as the defendant earn 
a profit by maximizing revenue across both sides of the 
platform and can do so even if one side operates at a loss.65 
Further, “[p]rice increases on one side of the platform likewise 
do not suggest anticompetitive effects without some evidence 
that they have increased the overall cost of the platform’s 
services.”66 
 
60 Id. at 2297 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
61 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
62 Id. at 2284. 
63 See infra text accompanying notes 76–77. 
64 Id. at 2285–86. 
65 See id. 
66 Id. at 2286. 
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The Court cited a great deal of literature on distinctive 
features of two-sided platforms. It concluded that “in two-
sided transaction markets, only one market should be 
defined.”67 Why these observations entailed that 
noncompeting goods should be grouped into the same relevant 
market is not clear. The price and output of complements 
certainly affect a firm’s profit-maximizing output and price,68 
but that hardly requires redefinition of its market.69 Further, 
the Court’s discussion about the “transactional”70 nature of 
Amex’s platform applies to conventional markets where 
sellers and buyers meet face to face. It is hardly unique to 
platforms. For example, if a gardener pays three dollars for a 
packet of spinach seeds in a hardware store there is a single 
simultaneous transaction, but we would never define a single 
market for gardeners and spinach seeds. 
Without relying on an economically incoherent conception 
of a relevant market, the Court could simply have said that 
when power is sought to be proven by direct effects all relevant 
effects should be considered. It does not matter whether these 
effects occur in the same relevant market, because no relevant 
market need be defined in the first place. This is more 
consistent with Justice Breyer’s dissenting approach which (1) 
 
67 Id. at 2287 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Lapo Filistrucchi, 
Damien Geradin, Eric van Damme & Pauline Affeldt, Market Definition in 
Two–Sided Markets: Theory and Practice, 10 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 
293, 302 (2014); see also David S. Evans & Michael Noel, Defining Antitrust 
Markets When Firms Operate Two–Sided Platforms, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 667, 671 (2005)). 
68 In general, the presence of a substitute serves to increase a firm’s 
own price elasticity of demand, thus reducing its power; the presence of a 
complement serves to reduce a firm’s own price elasticity of demand, thus 
increasing its power. Both are considered in ordinary methodologies for 
computing residual demand. See generally Aviv Nevo, Mergers with 
Differentiated Products: The Case of the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry, 
31 RAND J. ECON. 395 (2000); Gregory J. Werden, Demand Elasticities in 
Antitrust Analysis, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 363 (1998). On application to two-
sided platforms, see generally Andre Boik & Kenneth S. Corts, The Effects 
of Platform Most-Favored-Nation Clauses on Competition and Entry, 59 J. 
L. & ECON. 105 (2016). 
69 See infra notes 110–11 and accompanying text. 
70 See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2286–87. 
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eschewed reliance on market definition;71 but (2) would 
consider all effects rather than just benefits on one side of the 
platform.72 The district court was also clear on that point, 
although the majority opinion ignored it. Indeed, one of the 
district court’s fact findings was that the antisteering rule 
resulted in higher product prices across the board for 
merchants who accepted the Amex card, whether or not the 
customer used that card.73 That finding alone was sufficient 
to establish the defendant’s power, as well as anticompetitive 
effects. 
In a footnote, the Court concluded that while direct proof 
of market power does not require proof of a relevant market 
in a horizontal case, it did in a vertical case such as this. The 
Court stated: 
The plaintiffs argue that we need not define the 
relevant market in this case because they have offered 
actual evidence of adverse effects on competition—
namely, increased merchant fees. We disagree. The 
cases that the plaintiffs cite for this proposition 
evaluated whether horizontal restraints had an 
adverse effect on competition. . . . Given that 
horizontal restraints involve agreements between 
competitors not to compete in some way, this Court 
concluded that it did not need to precisely define the 
relevant market to conclude that these agreements 
were anticompetitive. . . . But vertical restraints are 
different. Vertical restraints often pose no risk to 
competition unless the entity imposing them has 
market power, which cannot be evaluated unless the 
Court first defines the relevant market.74 
This confusing statement appears to do no more than 
assume the conclusion. The Court did not clarify why 
 
71 See id. at 2294–96. 
72 See id. at 2296–97. 
73 See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 208 
(E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. 
Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018); see also infra notes 146–53 and 
accompanying text. 
74 Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2285 n.7 (internal citations omitted). 
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horizontal and vertical restraints should be treated differently 
in situations where both require proof of market power. One 
possibility, which Justice Breyer mentioned in his dissent, is 
that the majority believed that there was some category of 
anticompetitive effects that could be established without 
market power.75 The final sentence of the statement appears 
to conclude as a statement of law something that in reality 
presents a question of fact, and that in any event is incorrect. 
There is no obvious reason why power cannot be inferred from 
effects in both horizontal and vertical cases. For example, in 
exclusive dealing cases, which are vertical, evidence that a 
defendant was able to exclude a rival or suppress its sales 
even while keeping its own price high is certainly probative, 
as the Eleventh Circuit found in McWane, Inc. v. FTC.76 
Direct proof has its own limitations, of course. The facts must 
indicate that exclusion is a consequence of anticompetitive 
behavior rather than efficiency, but there is no obvious reason 
for thinking these things are fundamentally different in a 
vertical case. 
Further, the Court’s analysis is regressive, given the 
significant work in economics that both weakens the case for 
traditional market definition and improves upon econometric 
methodologies for measuring market power more directly.77 
This is particularly true when the immediate concern is the 
ability of a firm or group of firms to increase price above the 
competitive level through means other than collusion.78 When 
the issue is likelihood of collusion, on the other hand, then 
market definition may be an aid in identifying those in the 
 
75 See id. at 2297 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“One critical point that the 
majority’s argument ignores is that proof of actual adverse effects on 
competition is, a fortiori, proof of market power.”). 
76 See McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 829–32 (11th Cir. 2015). 
77 See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 58. 
78 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Markets in Merger Analysis, 57 
ANTITRUST BULL. 887 (2012); Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 68 
(2010) (noting the move away from traditional market definition in merger 
analysis); Gregory J. Werden, Market Delineation and the Justice 
Department’s Merger Guidelines, 1983 DUKE L.J. 514, 572–74 (1983). 
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collusive group, and also their relative strengths as cartel 
contributors or enforcers.79 The alarming thing about the 
Court’s footnote is that it does not engage or even cite any of 
the extensive literature on the measurement of market power, 
providing not one single empirical rationale for the conclusion 
it draws. Indeed, the proposition that the Court asserted – 
namely, that a plaintiff in any vertical restraints case must 
define a relevant market no matter how power is sought to be 
established –was never briefed. Further, the Court stated this 
conclusion as a rule of law. Clearly, the permissible 
methodologies for proving power—a question of expert 
testimony—should be a question of fact.   
Market definition is even less reliable as an indicator of 
power in markets of significantly differentiated products.80 
Market definition is necessarily binary, putting products 
either inside or outside of the market. Placing differentiated 
products in the same market serves to exaggerate the degree 
of competition. Placing a differentiated product outside serves 
to understate the degree of competition. Amex concerned 
differentiated payment systems, as well as differentiation in 
costs and perks within the group of general purpose credit 
cards. Further, the fundamental concern was with high prices 
but not with collusion among issuers. In that case, measuring 
market power by reference to share of a defined market seems 
distinctly inferior. 
In any event, the Court then held that the proper relevant 
market for considering the restraint at issue was both sides of 
the platform.81 It also referred to “credit-card transactions as 
 
79 These are principal attributes of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 
which is often used in merger enforcement and requires a market definition. 
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 12.4 (5th ed. 2016); John Kwoka, Reviving 
Merger Control: A Comprehensive Plan for Reforming Policy and Practice 
7–8 (Oct. 9, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.antitrust 
institute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Kwoka-Reviving-Merger-Control-
October-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/HX3Z-CKE2]. 
80 See 2B AREEDA ET AL., supra note 58, at ¶ 563; Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Response: Markets in IP and Antitrust, 100 GEO. L.J. 2133, 2146 (2012). 
81 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2286 (2018). 
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a whole” as the relevant market.82 That odd usage, of grouping 
both the buyer and seller into the same relevant market, 
would make any coherent economic analysis of the relevant 
market impossible, which is apparently why the opinion 
limited this definition to credit card transactions rather than 
transactions generally. Since every sale in a market involves 
a transaction, a broader conclusion would require holding that 
the spinach seeds and the gardener who purchases them are 
in the same market simply because they are simultaneously 
on the buy- and sell-side of the same transaction. 
Concluding that credit card transactions make up the 
relevant market should also have given the decision to the 
plaintiff. The record established unambiguously that the 
antisteering rule forced a specific buyer and seller to replace 
a lower price transaction that both preferred in favor of a 
higher cost transaction that injured both of them, as well as 
rival card issuers.83 In other words, it established exclusion, 
harm to the affected parties, and higher prices across the 
board. 
Importantly, the Court cabined this noneconomic market 
definition conclusion in other ways, adding this critical 
limitation: 
To be sure, it is not always necessary to consider both 
sides of a two-sided platform. A market should be 
treated as one sided when the impacts of indirect 
network effects and relative pricing in that market are 
minor. Newspapers that sell advertisements, for 
example, arguably operate a two-sided platform 
because the value of an advertisement increases as 
more people read the newspaper. But in the 
newspaper-advertisement market, the indirect 
networks effects operate in only one direction; 
newspaper readers are largely indifferent to the 
amount of advertising that a newspaper contains. 
Because of these weak indirect network effects, the 
market for newspaper advertising behaves much like 
a one-sided market and should be analyzed as such. 
 
82 Id. at 2287. 
83 See infra notes 180–91 and accompanying text. 
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But two-sided transaction platforms, like the 
credit-card market, are different. These platforms 
facilitate a single, simultaneous transaction between 
participants. For credit cards, the network can sell its 
services only if a merchant and cardholder both 
simultaneously choose to use the network. Thus, 
whenever a credit-card network sells one transaction’s 
worth of card-acceptance services to a merchant it also 
must sell one transaction’s worth of card-payment 
services to a cardholder. It cannot sell transaction 
services to either cardholders or merchants 
individually. To optimize sales, the network must find 
the balance of pricing that encourages the greatest 
number of matches between cardholders and 
merchants.84 
Platforms that “facilitate a single, simultaneous 
transaction between participants”85 would include the credit 
card networks and very likely also ride-sharing platforms, 
such as Uber or Lyft, and perhaps eBay or Airbnb, which 
function mainly as brokers between buyers and sellers. The 
Court itself acknowledged that it would not include platforms 
such as newspapers, where there is no transaction-specific 
relationship between the two sides. A fortiori, it does not 
include television or radio stations that accept advertising 
revenue from one side. Nor would it include advertising-
supported computer search engines, music streaming, or other 
advertiser-supported computer applications in which 
advertising satisfies the company’s general revenue 
requirements, but there is no one-to-one transaction between 
the user and the advertiser. And it would exclude networks 
that sell things such as health insurance, where the buyer and 
seller do not engage in simultaneous transactions on a per-
service basis.86 
The Court concluded that assessing competitive effects of 
a two-sided transaction platform required the fact finder to 
 
84 Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2286 (citations omitted). 
85 Id. 
86 See infra note 215 and accompanying text. 
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evaluate both sides.87 Here, the Court held, the plaintiffs had 
not carried their burden: 
Focusing on merchant fees alone misses the mark 
because the product that credit-card companies sell is 
transactions, not services to merchants, and the 
competitive effects of a restraint on transactions 
cannot be judged by looking at merchants alone. 
Evidence of a price increase on one side of a two-sided 
transaction platform cannot by itself demonstrate an 
anticompetitive exercise of market power. To 
demonstrate anticompetitive effects on the two-sided 
credit-card market as a whole, the plaintiffs must 
prove that Amex’s antisteering provisions increased 
the cost of credit-card transactions above a 
competitive level, reduced the number of credit-card 
transactions, or otherwise stifled competition in the 
credit-card market.88 
Further, the majority concluded, “[t]he plaintiffs did not 
offer any evidence that the price of credit-card transactions 
was higher than the price one would expect to find in a 
competitive market.”89 Rather, “Amex’s increased merchant 
fees reflect increases in the value of its services and the cost 
of its transactions, not an ability to charge above a competitive 
price.”90 
What the Court said could not possibly have been true of 
potential customers who would have agreed to a steering offer. 
Clearly, they did not value the perks by more than the 
merchant’s offered inducement, or else they would not have 
preferred to switch. That is, the relevant question concerned 
the marginal effect on consumers and merchants that 
resulted from the no steering rule.91 It is also worth noting 
that proof of any of these things does not rest on the premise 
that the merchant and customer sides of the platform were in 
the same relevant market. Further, the majority opinion 
 
87 Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2287. 
88 Id. (citations omitted). 
89 Id. at 2288. 
90 Id. 
91 See infra notes 183–88 and accompanying text. 
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ignored numerous explicit fact findings in the district court, 
all of which took effects on both sides into account but were 
based on an economically coherent market definition.92 
The Court also concluded that a dealer offering a discount 
to customers for purchasing with an alternative card was a 
form of free riding that “undermines the cardholder’s 
expectation of ‘welcome acceptance’—the promise of a 
frictionless transaction.”93 “A lack of welcome acceptance at 
one merchant makes a cardholder less likely to use Amex at 
all other merchants.”94 The Court described this “lack of 
welcome acceptance” as an “externality” that “endangers the 
viability of the entire Amex network,”95 and likened the 
situation to the use of resale price maintenance to prevent one 
seller from free riding on the efforts of a competing seller.96 
III. OBSERVATIONS: APPLYING THE RULE OF 
REASON TO PLATFORM EXCLUSION 
A. The Significance of Burden Shifting 
While all members of the Court nominally agreed with the 
rule of reason’s three-part burden-shifting analysis, the 
majority appeared to believe that the entire antitrust 
challenge depended on the plaintiff’s prima facie case. Some 
writers on two-sided platforms make the same mistake, 
 
92 See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 174 
(E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. 
Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018) (“American Express is correct that 
the court must account for the two-sided features of the credit card 
industry[.]”). The Second Circuit acknowledged this as well, but apparently 
concluded that benefits could be assessed only with a market definition that 
included both sides. United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 199–
200 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 
(2018); see also infra notes 149–51 and accompanying text. 
93 Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2289 (citing Am. Express Co., 88 F. 
Supp. 3d at 156). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 2289–90 (citing Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, 
Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890–91. (2007)); see also infra notes 134–38 and 
accompanying text. 
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faulting analyses such as the district court’s for looking only 
at one side of the market.97 But that clearly is not what the 
district court did in this case, and it is not the proper way to 
think of the burden shifting rule-of-reason framework. The 
prima facie case considers whether the plaintiff has presented 
enough evidence of competitive harm to require the defendant 
to offer an explanation.98 Because the defendant is the creator 
of its restraint and presumably knows what its motives were, 
it is in a far better position to provide proof of its rationale and 
effects. If it had a procompetitive justification, such as cost 
reduction or product improvement, that must have been a 
motivating factor in its creation of the restraint.99 In any 
event, the district court made clear that its analysis 
considered both sides of the market even under the burden 
shifting approach.100 
B. Platform Market Delineation 
The majority never explained why assessing effects on both 
sides of a platform required jettisoning economically coherent 
conceptions of the relevant market as a group of substitute 
goods or services. That is, a relevant market is a “collusive 
group.”101 Putting production complements into the same 
market simply because making a deal requires both 
introduces economic nonsense into the law and economics of 
market power. Superior techniques exist for evaluating the 
pricing relationship among substitutes and complements, and 
 
97 See, e.g., Filistrucchi et al., supra note 67, at 301. 
98 See supra text accompanying notes 50–51.  
99 See 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, at ¶ 1505a; Herbert 
Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 81, 107 (2018). 
100 See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 171 
(E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. 
Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
101 See, e.g., Kenneth D. Boyer, Industry Boundaries, in ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS & ANTITRUST LAW 70, 73–74 (Terry Calvani & John Siegfried eds., 
2d ed. 1988); Gregory J. Werden, The History of Antitrust Market 
Delineation, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 123, 188–89 (1992). 
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their effects on market power.102 These techniques do not 
require abandonment of sensible economics. In some cases, 
however, they may serve to strengthen or weaken the 
inference of power that can be drawn from computation of a 
market share. Unfortunately, parties will likely waste many 
hours of litigation resources disputing whether the “relevant 
market” in their particular case should include complements 
as well as substitutes. 
As Justice Breyer observed in his dissent, “[t]he phrase 
‘two-sided transaction platform’ is not one of antitrust 
art[.]”103 The important points, as he observed, are that such 
platforms “(1) offer different products or services, (2) to 
different groups of customers, (3) whom the ‘platform’ 
connects, (4) in simultaneous transactions.”104 But the 
majority made no attempt to explain why this set of facts 
required the Court to develop an economically incoherent 
conception of the relevant market. 
The dissent’s logic here is inescapable. Market definition 
and market share are only the starting points in the analysis 
of market power by indirect measures. At that point, a court 
must consider a number of things that give meaning to market 
shares.105 The Second Circuit lost sight of this when it held 
that the district court could not have accounted for the two-
sided features of the credit-card industry without a market 
definition that included both.106 When relying on proof from 
market share, a far better approach is to start out with a 
 
102 For an introduction, see generally Jonathan B. Baker, Unilateral 
Competitive Effects Theories in Merger Analysis, 11 ANTITRUST 21 (1997). 
See also Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Empirical Methods 
of Identifying and Measuring Market Power, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 3 (1992). For 
an updated and somewhat more critical overview, see Daniel A. Crane, 
Market Power Without Market Definition, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 31 (2014). 
103 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2298 (2018) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
104 Id. 
105 See 2B AREEDA ET AL., supra note 58, at ¶¶ 532–33. 
106 See United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 196, 200 (2d 
Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
The Supreme Court did not discuss the fact finding. See generally Am. 
Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274. 
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properly defined group of substitutes and then consider other 
factors that might strengthen or weaken any inference of 
power drawn from market share. In this case, the alleged 
relevant market and the one the district court focused on was 
economically sensible—namely a “network services market” 
for general purpose charge cards, in which the purchasers 
were merchants.107 To this, the Second Circuit required the 
addition of cardholders.108 Cardholder transactions were not 
competitors with network services, but rather were 
complements in production.109 
It is difficult to see any added value coming from a 
linguistic requirement that both sides of the platform be 
placed within the same market.110 It certainly cannot be to 
assess collusion possibilities because the two sides do not 
compete with each other. The presence of a second side may 
affect the ability of the first side to exercise power, but no part 
of that determination requires a conclusion that the second 
side is in the same market. The availability or price of 
complements can certainly limit a firm’s ability to increase its 
price. For example, the limited supply and high price of 
gasoline might limit a firm’s ability to charge a higher price 
for its automobiles. This is another way of saying that 
substitutes and complements pull in opposite directions when 
one is estimating a firm’s market power: high prices for 
substitutes tend to increase it, while high prices for 
complements tend to decrease it.111 Economists have been 
 
107 See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 171 
(E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d., 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. 
Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
108 See Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d at 197. 
109 See infra at notes 132–133 and accompanying text. 
110 See Carlton, supra note 15. 
111 See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text; see also Werden, 
supra note 68, at 398. Conceptually, a firm’s market power is determined 
by its own price elasticity of demand, which is the weighted sum of the cross 
elasticities of all other products with respect to the first product’s price. See 
Kaplow, supra note 58, at 485–86. In practice, direct measurement of a 
firm’s own price elasticity is easier than, and preferable to, attempts to 
measure cross-elasticities with potentially competing products. Id. at 490. 
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making such calculations for decades,112 and without doing 
anything as irrational as grouping substitutes and 
complements into a single market. 
What the Supreme Court majority was apparently trying 
to do is force the plaintiff to consider burdens and benefits on 
both sides of the platform as part of its prima facie case. The 
district court seems to have done that quite adequately,113 but 
it did not add the verbal flourish that the two sides were in a 
single relevant market. How its analysis would have been any 
different if it had done so is not clear. 
The Second Circuit expressed concern that limiting the 
market to substitutes would ignore “feedback effects”—
namely that a “reduction in cardholders’ demand for cards (or 
card transactions) . . . would accompany any degree of 
merchant attrition.”114 Of course, that would be true of any 
firm that sold complementary products. For example, a grocer 
that sells both milk and Cheerios would have to consider that 
a price increase in milk might reduce the demand for 
Cheerios. This would not warrant creating a single market for 
milk and Cheerios, although it might require the fact finder 
to consider what impact reduced demand for Cheerios might 
have on the profitability of the higher-priced milk. That is 
fundamentally a demand elasticity problem, not a problem in 
market delineation, and further illustrates why the Court’s 
insistence on a traditional market definition in a vertical case 
makes so little sense. In an extreme case, an increase in the 
price of milk might impact Cheerios so severely as to make it 
an unsustainable product. In all events, the “feedback” 
equilibrium depends on all market conditions, including price, 
that operate on both sides of the platform. A judicial order 
permitting steering would simply move this equilibrium to a 
different place. In general, the more competitive the two sides 
of the market are, the less profitable this equilibrium would 
 
112 See Werden, supra note 68, at 398 (citing JOE S. BAIN, PRICE THEORY 
25–26, 50–53 (1952); FRITZ MACHLUP, THE ECONOMICS OF SELLERS 
COMPETITION 213–14 (1952)). 
113 See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. 
114 United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 200 (2d Cir. 2016), 
aff’d sub nom. United States v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
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be. In any event, a lost transaction to Amex would be a gained 
transaction to a lower priced network, affecting the latter’s 
feedback effect as well. 
Indeed, the district court also used a version of this 
feedback argument to make the opposite point, and its 
analysis was more persuasive. It concluded that the impact of 
the antisteering rule was to create “derived demand” for the 
Amex card by deterring customers from switching away, 
which in turn supported increased merchant fees.115 This was 
more persuasive because it considered marginal—rather than 
average—behavior. The reason this rationale is more 
persuasive is that each and every customer who would have 
switched away from Amex as a result of steering in fact 
experienced a loss in value, as did each and every merchant 
forced to make the transaction using the Amex card.116 There 
were no gains on either side, but rather losses on both. Profits 
accrued only to the network operator, not to merchants or card 
users. The only remaining question was whether the 
antisteering rule was necessary to provide the minimum 
volume necessary for the network operator’s viability. 
Assuming that is a viable defense, one does not need a special 
theory of platforms in order to answer that question.  
Similar situations can arise in exclusive dealing cases, 
where viability of production facilities is sometimes raised as 
a defense. Suppose, for example, that Uber should impose 
exclusive dealing117 on its drivers, preventing them from 
driving for any competing company. To the extent Uber had 
the power to do so, this would prevent the drivers from selling 
their services to rivals such as Lyft or traditional taxicabs. 
One standard defense, as presented in Amex, would be that 
exclusive dealing is necessary to increase volume in order to 
make the Uber platform viable. That is a testable fact. 
 
115 See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 188 
(E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. 
Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
116 See infra notes 180–91 and accompanying text. 
117 More specifically, this would be an output contract, in which 
exclusive dealing is imposed on sellers rather than buyers. See 11 HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1803 (4th ed. 2018). 
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However, it could also be raised as a defense to any exclusive 
dealing claim, whether or not it involved a transactional 
network or any network at all. For example, in McWane, a 
more conventional exclusive dealing case, the defendant 
argued that exclusive dealing was necessary for it to maintain 
minimum viable scale in one of its plants.118 The Eleventh 
Circuit concluded that McWane did not show it needed 
exclusive dealing in order to get its volume up.119 Given its 
very high profit margins, it should simply have cut its 
prices.120 
By the same token, the evidence in Amex pertained to 
whether the antisteering rule was needed to protect Amex’s 
scale of operations necessary to keep its platform viable. Here, 
the record was clear. Amex offered high-cost cards and 
continuously raised its merchant prices under the 
antisteering rule.121 None of that depended on the fact that 
Amex was operating on a transaction platform. Even 
assuming that Amex had to increase card usage in order to 
make its platform viable—a fact that was never established—
it might have achieved viability by cutting its price. Further, 
the opinion says nothing about what Amex’s viability 
requirements were. As the district court observed and Justice 
Breyer noted, at trial Amex “presented no expert testimony, 
financial analysis, or other direct evidence establishing that 
without its [nondiscrimination provisions] it will, in fact, be 
unable to adapt its business to a more competitive market.”122 
Finally, the viability question is not one of networks, but 
rather of plain, old economies of scale or perhaps of scope. 
 
118 See McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 841 (11th Cir. 2015). 
119 See id. 
120 See id. 
121 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2293 (2018) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (noting that “American Express raised the prices it charged 
merchants on 20 separate occasions.”). 
122 Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2304 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting 
United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 231 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), 
rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 
138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018)). 
  
No. 1:35] PLATFORMS AND THE RULE OF REASON 63 
Properly conducted antitrust law already requires analysis 
of two sides in cases of vertical interbrand restraints, 
including the tying of complementary products, although it 
does not proceed by anything as economically incoherent as 
putting them into the same relevant market.123 The law of 
tying and exclusive dealing both assess competitive effects by 
examining power in a primary market and foreclosure in a 
secondary market. Typically, as in Amex, the two products are 
complements. The principal exception is tying law’s 
inappropriate but nevertheless tenacious per se rule, which 
permits an anticompetitive tie to be inferred without 
reference to foreclosure.124 
To illustrate, in Jefferson Parish v. Hyde, the Supreme 
Court dismissed a challenge to a hospital-anesthesiology 
services tie under the rule of reason after finding that the 
defendant hospital’s admission of thirty percent of the 
surgical patients in the relevant market was inadequate.125 
Importantly, the Court did not define a single market for 
anesthesiologists and surgical patients. Hospitals, it should 
be noted, are two-sided platforms servicing providers on one 
side and patients on the other. 
Anticompetitive harm in vertical interbrand foreclosure 
cases such as Jefferson Parish requires a showing of some 
degree of presence in the primary market and some minimum 
amount of foreclosure, exclusion, or perhaps a price increase 
in the complementary market.126 For example, in the well-
known Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co. exclusive 
dealing case, the utility controlled a dominant position in the 
market for electric power in its service area and consumed 
eighteen percent of the coal consumed in Florida and 
 
123 Cf. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 171 (including effects on the 
other side of the market expressly). 
124 See 9 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 
1720 (4th ed. 2018). 
125 Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 7, 26–27 (1984) 
(noting that defendant lacked power because seventy percent of surgical 
patients in the area went to other hospitals). 
126 On market definition for purposes of assessing vertical foreclosure, 
see 2B AREEDA ET AL., supra note 58, at ¶ 570. 
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Georgia.127 Under existing exclusive dealing standards, that 
percentage would have been sufficient for illegality.128 The 
Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, however, because 
the coal that it purchased represented “less than 1% of the 
total marketed production” of coal that was available for 
Tampa Electric to purchase.129 The Court did not attempt to 
define a single market for coal and electric power. Indeed, 
doing so would have undermined the competitive analysis. 
Looking at the Tampa utility’s side of the market alone 
seriously exaggerated the competitive harm. In Tampa 
Electric, the Court got to the correct result by limiting both 
the upstream and downstream markets to substitutes and 
then assessing the competitive harm. As Justice Breyer 
queried in Amex, “What is it about the economic relationship 
between merchant-related and shopper-related services that 
would justify the majority’s novel approach to market 
definition?”130 Economically speaking, the analysis of market 
pairs for purposes of evaluating vertical interbrand restraints 
is no different from the analysis of platforms.131 
C. Complements in Use or Production 
On the question of complements, the Amex majority 
concluded that the two sides of the transaction were not 
complements because they were not purchased by the same 
buyers.132 The dissent countered that they were, and that 
putting complements and substitutes into the same market 
 
127 See Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 331 
(1961). 
128 See Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 295, 305 
(1949) (condemning exclusive dealing contracts covering 6.7% of total 
retailed gasoline). 
129 Tampa Electric, 365 U.S. at 331. 
130 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2299 (2018) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
131 On this point, see generally Carlton & Winter, supra note 17. 
132 Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2286 n.8 (asserting that the two were 
not complements “in which both products are bought by the same buyers” 
(quoting Filistrucchi et al., supra note 67, at 297)). 
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was “economic nonsense.”133 What neither side stated clearly 
was that the two sides were clearly complements, but they 
were complements in production rather than use. The 
majority was thinking of complements in use, such as toast 
and jam, or gardeners and spinach seed. Complements in 
production are goods or services that are produced together, 
such as beef and cowhide, oil and natural gas, lumber and 
sawdust, or voice services and messaging services. The 
majority’s acknowledgement that each cardholder transaction 
is necessarily offset by an equal merchant transaction 
acknowledged as much.134 Complements in production behave 
in ways similar to complements in use. For example, strong 
demand for oil leads to higher oil prices. Necessarily, however, 
increasing oil production will increase gas production because 
gas is a natural byproduct. If the demand for gas remains 
constant, its price will fall just as oil prices rise. 
D. Free Rider Concerns 
The majority was confused about the existence and nature 
of free riding. It spoke of the other card companies as free 
riding on Amex’s “investments in rewards[,]” likening the 
antisteering provision to the use of resale price maintenance 
to protect against dealer free riding.135 But as the dissent 
properly noted, the Amex rewards attach to specific 
transactions, not to mere possession of the card.136 If a 
cardholder earned its perks simply by owning an Amex card, 
then, of course, free riding would be possible. A customer 
might acquire the card in order to obtain the perks but then 
make its actual transactions with a lower priced card. The 
majority paid little attention to the record, but the district 
 
133 Id. at 2295–96 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting 2B AREEDA ET AL., 
supra note 58, at ¶ 565a, at 431). 
134 See id. at 2286. 
135 See id. at 2289–90 (citing Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. 
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890–91 (2007)). 
136 Id. at 2304 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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court was clear on the point137 and it seems incontrovertible. 
The policy is clear on Amex’s own website.138 
The all-important ingredient in the free-rider explanation 
of resale price maintenance or other dealer restraints is that 
the manufacturer is unable to price out services distinctly 
from the product itself. For example, it cannot charge 
customers separately for the well-trained sales staff but must 
include it in the price of the basic product. That makes it 
possible for the customer to segregate the two—obtaining 
product education from the full-service dealer, but then 
purchasing the product from the discounter.139 However, if 
the issuer attaches the perks strictly to payment for the 
product, then “the ride is not free,” in Judge Frank 
Easterbrook’s words.140 
The majority’s free rider argument was attached to a 
perspective on consumer behavior that can only be described 
as economically bizarre, and certainly contrary to our usual 
assumption that consumers are rational maximizers of their 
own utility. The majority spoke of the antisteering provision 
as promoting “welcome acceptance” of its card.141 “Welcome 
acceptance” in this case apparently meant that the buyer 
 
137 United States v. Am. Express Co, 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 237 (E.D.N.Y. 
2015), rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express 
Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). (“Plainly . . . investments tied to card use (such 
as Membership Rewards points, purchase protection, and the like) are not 
subject to free-riding, since the network does not incur any cost if the 
cardholder is successfully steered away from using his or her American 
Express card.”). 
138 See, e.g., Extended Warranty Description of Coverage, AM. EXPRESS 
https://www.americanexpress.com/content/dam/amex/us/credit-
cards/features-benefits/policies/pdf/EW%20Benefit%20Guide_Tier% 
201%20Rev%2007-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TEZ-HNNL] (describing 
extended warranty protection offered with Amex Platinum Card, provided 
that the product in question was purchased with the card). 
139 See Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 
3 J.L. & ECON. 86, 91–92 (1960); see also 8 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1613 (4th ed. 2017). 
140 Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 675 (7th Cir. 
1992) (“When payment is possible, free-riding is not a problem because the 
‘ride’ is not free.”). 
141 Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2289. 
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should be prevented from being offered or even told about the 
availability of a cheaper alternative. Amex made this 
argument in its brief, offered as a Hail Mary pass, which the 
majority caught.142 The Second Circuit had decided that 
“welcome acceptance” was a viable defense because loss of a 
sale via steering could have a negative impact on both sides of 
the market.143 Factually, of course, it could be true that loss 
of “welcome acceptance” on one product could impair a firm’s 
earnings on a complementary product. For example, 
condemnation of a cartel’s boycott of a price cutter in its 
primary market could also have a negative impact on the sales 
of a complement, or impairing a grocer’s milk sales might also 
harm that grocer’s sale of Cheerios. By contrast, the district 
court took a much more economically rational view of the 
situation, namely that “[a]llowing merchants to actively 
participate in their customers’ point-of-sale decisions would 
remove the artificial barrier that now segregates merchant 
demand from the price of network services[.]”144 
Putting the most sensible gloss on the argument, Amex 
had invested in a business model that depended on high 
merchant acceptance fees. When a merchant offered a 
customer a lower price to use a different card, that offer 
undermined Amex’s model. Factually, of course, that is true. 
Anytime a merchant tells a buyer that a better deal is 
available than the buyer’s initially chosen one it serves to 
diminish “welcome acceptance” of that initial offer. Indeed, 
competition of any sort does that. One wonders if that 
argument, which now has the majority’s imprimatur, will also 
 
142 See Brief for Respondents Am. Express Co. & Am. Express Travel 
Related Servs. Co., Inc. at 9, Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (No. 16-1454). 
143 See United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 191 (2d Cir. 
2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (“Although 
merchants across various industries regularly try to ‘steer’ their customers 
toward certain purchasing decisions via strategic product placement, 
discounts, and other deals, steering within the credit-card industry can be 
harmful insofar as it interferes with a network’s ability to balance its two-
sided net price.”). 
144 United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 220–21 
(E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016, aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. 
Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
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appear as a defense to price fixing. After all, permitting rivals 
to offer a lower price than the cartel’s offer will undermine 
“welcome acceptance” of the cartel’s product.145 
Further, the majority failed to observe the one instance of 
free riding that the facts indicated. The antisteering rule 
made the Amex cardholder indifferent as to which card he or 
she used, because the increased cost was borne entirely by the 
merchant. The merchant for its part had to absorb these 
higher costs, which it did via higher product prices, as the 
district court also found.146 Effectively, all purchasers, 
whether they used an Amex card or any card at all, were 
forced to subsidize Amex’s higher merchant acceptance fees. 
That was a true case of free riding. 
The Second Circuit did not disagree with this fact finding, 
but it held that higher product prices could be justified by the 
greater value of Amex’s perks to its own cardholders, 
particularly for merchants where Amex cardholders insisted 
on paying with the Amex card and nothing else.147 What the 
Second Circuit apparently did not see is that this finding 
conceded Amex’s market power: that is, it had the power to 
compel higher merchant product prices across the board in 
order to subsidize Amex’s perks to its own cardholders. A firm 
that lacked power would not be able to compel higher prices 
market wide, harming everyone else for the benefit of its own 
customers. The Supreme Court did not discuss the Second 
Circuit’s treatment of the issue. 
E. Use of the Record 
One of the rule of reason’s most essential features is 
development and analysis of a record. The rule of reason 
requires detailed factual analysis because the restraint is not 
of a type that can be disposed of categorically, as under per se 
rules of illegality or legality.148 The Brooke Group, Ltd. v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. predatory pricing case 
 
145 See Hovenkamp, supra note 15, at 31. 
146 See infra note 154 and accompanying text. 
147 See Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d at 202. 
148 See 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, at ¶¶ 1507–08. 
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provides an instructive example, where the Supreme Court 
carefully reviewed the record, citing it nearly twenty times 
and ultimately agreeing with the district court that the 
plaintiff’s legal case had failed.149 
By contrast, the Supreme Court’s Amex opinion contains 
only a single mention of the record, for a proposition unrelated 
to the challenged restraint, and virtually no analysis.150 The 
Second Circuit had discussed the record multiple times, 
mainly concerning the district court’s conclusion that the 
relevant market must be limited to reasonably 
interchangeable goods. The Second Circuit also concluded 
that harms to merchants needed to be offset by benefits to 
cardholders, and that only a market definition that grouped 
the two together could do that.151 It did not acknowledge that 
for cardholders affected by the antisteering rule, the benefits 
were necessarily less than the higher fees.152 The Supreme 
Court did not discuss these findings either. On the district 
court’s finding of higher retail prices, the Second Circuit held 
that this conclusion was error because it “fail[ed] to take into 
account offsetting benefits to cardholders in the form of 
rewards and other services.”153 That was tantamount to a 
conclusion that Amex was entitled to raise merchant prices 
across the board for the benefit of its own cardholders.154 
While the majority did not disagree with or repudiate the 
district court’s detailed fact findings, it made almost no use of 
them—a point that the dissenters noted.155 Indeed, the only 
way that the Court could reach its conclusions was by ignoring 
the record. While the majority opinion did cite significant 
 
149 See generally Brooke Grp., Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
150 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2282 (2018) (citing 
record for proposition that Amex made some banking and payment services 
available to low-income individuals). 
151 See Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d at 205. 
152 See infra notes 188–92 and accompanying text. 
153 See Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d at 204 n.52. 
154 On the free rider issue, see supra notes 94–96, 134–45 and 
accompanying text. 
155 See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2293 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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academic economics literature on the issue of platforms, the 
Court made very little use of it other than setting up some 
basic definitions. In, fact, the Court never bothered to analyze 
the particular transactions at issue and how the antisteering 
rule affected consumer behavior and welfare. 
By contrast, the dissent summarized the district court’s 
conclusions: Under the antisteering rule, Amex was able to 
increase merchant acceptance fees approximately twenty 
times during a five-year period, specifically because it did not 
have to worry about merchants shifting their customers to a 
less costly card.156 It found that in the absence of the no-
steering rule, merchant acceptance fees “would likely have 
been lower.”157 It also found that the antisteering rule had 
successfully deterred an attempt by Discover, a competitor, to 
switch merchants by offering them lower acceptance fees.158 
The district court also found that for many merchants the 
costs of credit card acceptance were “among many merchants’ 
highest,” giving them “a strong economic incentive to take 
steps to reduce” them.159 The court concluded that the 
“Plaintiffs additionally are able to show harm to those same 
merchants’ customers on the other side of the GPCC platform, 
as inflated merchant discount rates are passed on to all 
customers—AmEx cardholders and non-cardholders alike—in 
the form of higher retail prices.”160 
The key target of the Sherman Act’s restraint of trade 
standard is reduced output and, consequently, higher 
prices.161 The particular fact finding by the district court hit 
 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 2293–94. On the use of vertical most-favored-nation clauses 
or similar practices to deter entry, see Carlton, supra note 15. 
159 United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 221 (E.D.N.Y. 
2015), rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express 
Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
160 Id. at 208. 
161 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Is Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle 
Imperiled?, 44 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 3), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3197329 
[https://perma.cc/EG3A-6N3C]. 
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that target’s bullseye. On the question of output, the record 
showed everything that the Court needed to know. The 
antisteering rule shifted deals to a higher cost transaction 
that resulted in lost value to both the affected cardholder and 
merchant. Further, it resulted in higher product prices across 
the board, even to those who purchased without the use of the 
Amex card. 
The district court had also concluded that “the customer 
neither sees nor pays the additional cost when networks 
increase the price of network services to merchants (other 
than in the form of higher retail prices, which are paid by all 
consumers); thus, the customer cannot be expected to initiate 
substitution in the first instance.”162 As Justice Breyer 
described this evidence, it showed that “[c]onsumers 
throughout the economy paid higher retail prices as a 
result[.]”163 The district court also observed that Amex 
“sharply dispute[d]” these fact findings but resolved them in 
favor of the government.164 The Supreme Court did not upset 
that conclusion. 
F. Inattentiveness to Economic Analysis 
Another point missing from the majority opinion was 
analysis of how the antisteering rule affected market 
participants. The Court apparently reasoned that because 
transactions on the two sides of the platform balanced out, 
this meant that “costs” on one side of a platform are offset by 
“benefits” on the other side.165 This assumption, which is 
 
162 Am. Express Co. 88 F. Supp. 3d at 177. The district court concluded 
that “[i]n the longer term, the court expects that merchants will pass along 
some amount of the savings associated with declining swipe fees to their 
customers in the form of lower retail prices.” Id. at 221. 
163 See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2294 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
164 See Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 222. 
165 See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2288. The Second Circuit made 
the same assumption. See United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 
203 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 
(2018). Like the Supreme Court, it did not look at individual transactions 
but rather made general observations about increased aggregate value to 
one or the other side of the platform. 
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frequently made in bird’s-eye views of networks, drove much 
of the Court’s analysis. Thus in the Court’s mind it became 
essential to compare burdens and benefits on the two sides in 
making out a prima facie case.166 
Some cases involving two-sided platforms do involve 
offsetting costs and benefits on the two sides. This is 
particularly likely to be true when the only issue is source and 
amount of revenue. A good example is Wallace v. IBM.167 IBM 
used an open source program as the operating system for one 
of its computer lines.168 As part of the open source licensing 
obligations, the program had to be given away for free.169 This 
is a common practice. For example, a large variety of smart 
phones are sold with the Google Android operating system 
included at a price of zero. IBM, of course, is not in the 
business of giving away software, but of selling computers, to 
which the software was distributed as a complement. Daniel 
Wallace had developed a competing, proprietary operating 
system that he wanted to sell to users of these computers,170 
but competing with a price of zero is difficult. Wallace accused 
IBM of predatory pricing.171 Judge Easterbrook dismissed the 
complaint, holding mainly that the facts did not fall within 
predatory pricing rules requiring a likelihood of 
recoupment.172 In any event, one cannot evaluate a claim such 
as predatory pricing without looking at all sources of revenue. 
The price of the computer-plus-operating system was never 
 
166 See, e.g., Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2288 (“Amex’s higher 
merchant fees are based on a careful study of how much additional value its 
cardholders offer merchants. On the other side of the market, Amex uses its 
higher merchant fees to offer its cardholders a more robust rewards 
program, which is necessary to maintain cardholder loyalty and encourage 
the level of spending that makes Amex valuable to merchants. That Amex 
allocates prices between merchants and cardholders differently from Visa 
and MasterCard is simply not evidence that it wields market power to 
achieve anticompetitive ends.”) (citations omitted). 
167 Wallace v. IBM Corp., 467 F.3d 1104 (7th Cir. 2006). 
168 Id. at 1107. 
169 Id. at 1105. 
170 Id. at 1106. 
171 See id. 
172 See id. at 1106, 1108. 
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alleged to be below cost, so the court rejected the predatory 
pricing claim. 
Another good example arose in Meyer v. Kalanick, which 
alleged that Uber was engaged in price fixing by setting a 
common price among its drivers.173 Price fixing is 
anticompetitive because it is an output reducing practice that 
results in higher consumer prices. But in order to determine 
output effects on a two-sided platform, one must see how the 
effects on one side play out on the other side, just as in 
Wallace. For that purpose, it is not necessary to do anything 
as irrational as define a single market for riders and drivers. 
Nevertheless, one must examine the economic rationales for 
Uber’s price in order to determine its effects on market output. 
As the operator of a platform, Uber needs to seek out the 
equilibrium spot that will bring in the optimal number of 
drivers and riders. Setting fares too high discourages riders, 
while setting them too low discourages drivers.174 
This process does not necessarily mean that Uber’s conduct 
is lawful, although it does indicate that it should not be 
addressed under the per se rule for ordinary price fixing. 
Indeed, the very fact that this price fixing occurs in the context 
of an elaborate joint venture should be a sufficient trigger for 
the rule of reason.175 Under this analysis, Uber’s conduct may 
still be unlawful. For example, perhaps Uber is controlled by 
a local cartel of drivers that has market power in some area. 
They set prices that are too high to maximize overall profits, 
but instead try to maximize the profits of the colluding 
drivers.176 The complaint challenges Uber’s “peak load” 
 
173 See Meyer v. Kalanick, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817, 819–20 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) 
(discussing antitrust issues in the context of a class action). 
174 See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text. 
175 Cf. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101–03 
(1984) (stating that the rule of reason must be applied if a restraint is 
essential to making the product available at all); Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 
Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 22–25 (1979) (rejecting claim of per se unlawful price fixing 
and applying the rule of reason to conduct on a two-sided platform that the 
Supreme Court described as price fixing). 
176 See First Amended Complaint at ¶ 4, Meyer, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817 
(No. 1:15-CV-9796), 2016 WL 950376 (alleging that Uber’s CEO conspired 
with drivers to increase prices at expense of riders); but see id. ¶ 47 (noting 
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pricing model that increases prices during busy periods, when 
demand is large in relation to driver supply.177 But that is 
precisely how one would expect an efficient two-sided platform 
to work in order to maintain an equilibrium between the two 
sides of the market. When rider side demand increases, a fare 
increase is necessary to balance that demand with the supply 
of drivers. Proof of antitrust harm would require additional 
evidence, such as proof of driver control and of an entry 
restriction that prevents additional drivers in such an area. 
In sum, anticompetitive harm is an unlikely scenario, but one 
that cannot be dismissed out of hand. 
Whether or not a firm operates a platform, evaluating its 
revenue requires examination of all relevant sources. For a 
non-platform illustration, Coca-Cola provides free coke 
machines to employers who agree to stock the machines 
exclusively with Coca-Cola products.178 But that does not 
necessarily mean that Coca-Cola is engaging in predatory 
pricing of dispensing machines. In order to determine the 
profitability of this enterprise one must look at the revenues 
obtained from both the dispensing machine and the products. 
Notably, one does not need to define a single relevant market 
for Coca-Cola and dispensing machines in order to answer 
that question. 
In Amex, however, the charge was not predatory pricing or 
price fixing, but rather an exclusionary practice more akin to 
exclusive dealing or a most-favored-nation (MFN) clause.179 
 
that “[f]ares are calculated based on an Uber-generated algorithm” which 
increases fares as demand increases in relation to supply (surge pricing)). 
Similar peak load pricing is common in intermediate sales of electric power, 
which also occurs on a two-sided platform between generators and users. 
See, e.g., RAFAL WERON, MODELING AND FORECASTING ELECTRICITY LOADS 
AND PRICES: A STATISTICAL APPROACH 4–5 (2006). 
177 See First Amended Complaint, supra note 176, at ¶¶ 2, 4, 47. 
178 Coke Vending Machine, VENDINGSOLUTIONS, 
http://www.vendingsolutions.com/coke-vending-machines 
[https://perma.cc/MVR6-4EJP]; see also Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 
942, 943 n.78 (2010). 
179 On antisteering rules as most-favored-nation clauses, see Carlton, 
supra note 15; see also Carlton & Winter, supra note 17, at 215–16. 
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Not only did the Court pay scant attention to the record, but 
it also never analyzed the transaction to determine how the 
harms and benefits balance out on the two sides. As Ronald 
Coase taught, when one wants to understand a practice, there 
is no good substitute for examining the incentives to make 
each individual transaction, small as they might be, and 
considering how they affect the whole.180 However, neither 
the Second Circuit nor the Supreme Court did this. 
G.  Marginal Harms and Benefits 
Competition always exists at the margin. It requires firms 
to make incremental changes to their business methods, 
continuously tracking and adjusting to reflect their successes 
or failures. These changes may or may not be anticompetitive, 
quite apart from the overall structure of the firm or 
organization that implements them. To the extent that a 
chosen rule or decision might harm competition, the rule of 
reason is designed to manage this process. For example, in 
Amex the government was not trying to tear down Amex’s 
entire business model, but only to enjoin its antisteering rule. 
Such a case requires an assessment of the marginal costs and 
benefits of the antisteering rule itself. One pervasive error in 
the Supreme Court majority’s analysis was that it failed to 
distinguish the challenged rule’s marginal effects from the 
overall impact of the defendant’s business model. It simply 
assumed that harms on one side were offset by benefits on the 
other, or else it spoke of evidence about the defendant’s overall 
business model. The record was clear, however, that at the 
margin each merchant affected by the steering rule was worse 
off, and each cardholder was worse off as well. Competitive 
harm was clear. 
One cannot evaluate the competitive effects of a particular 
restraint by considering whether the overall costs of a 
defendant’s business practices exceed the benefits. For 
example, in NCAA v. Board of Regents of University of 
Oklahoma, the challenge was not to the existence or 
 
180 See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 397–98 
(1937). 
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legitimacy of the NCAA as an association; rather it was to the 
effect of a limitation on the televising of games.181 The issue 
was whether the incremental harm to competition caused by 
the challenged restriction on the number of televised games 
was justified by offsetting incremental benefits.182 By the 
same token, the question in Amex was not whether Amex’s 
general business model of charging higher merchant fees for 
large perks produced overall benefits. Rather it was whether 
the incremental harm caused by the antisteering rule 
produced incremental competitive harms greater than 
incremental benefits. That would require an assessment of the 
competitive effects of that particular rule.  
The Second Circuit also confused total and marginal effects 
by stating that “because the NDPs183 affect competition for 
cardholders as well as merchants, the Plaintiffs initial burden 
was to show that the NDPs made all Amex consumers on both 
sides of the platform—i.e., both merchants and cardholders—
worse off overall.”184 
But that was not the question. As with any restraint, many 
customers were not affected at all. For example, the restraint 
on game televising in NCAA did not affect those who did not 
watch televised games at all.185 Similarly, rules imposing 
resale price maintenance affect only discounters who would 
otherwise charge a lower price.186 Standard setting and other 
boycott rules affect only producers at risk of violating a 
 
181 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 88 (1984); see 
also 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, at ¶¶ 1502–03, 1511. 
182 See id. at 94. 
183 The Second Circuit used the term “nondiscrimination provisions,” 
or NDPs to describe Amex’s policies “barring merchants from (1) offering 
customers any discounts or nonmonetary incentives to use credit cards less 
costly for merchants to accept, (2) expressing preferences for any card, or (3) 
disclosing information about the costs of different cards to merchants who 
accept them. United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 184 (2d Cir. 
2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
184 Id. at 205. 
185 See NCAA, 468 U.S. 85. 
186 See 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 139, at ¶¶ 1624d, 1625, 
1627. 
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standard.187 One might continue with such illustrations. But 
it should be clear that when the government was seeking only 
an injunction against the rule rather than complete 
destruction of the defendant’s business method, then it is the 
effect of that particular rule that must be examined. Here, 
those customers affected by the antisteering rule were those 
that would have switched to a less costly card but for the rule. 
By implication, the value they placed on the defendant’s perks 
was less than the incremental price to merchants of using the 
Amex card. 
Consider the following example, which can readily be 
generalized.188 On a typical transaction, the Amex merchant 
acceptance fee may be fifty percent greater than the fee 
charged by competing cards. Suppose that on a particular 
purchase Amex’s merchant fee was $30, but $20 for Visa. This 
$10 difference creates bargaining room—a “surplus,” in 
Coasean terms189—for the merchant and the cardholder to 
strike a mutually beneficial deal. Suppose that the merchant 
offers the customer a $6 discount for using a Visa card instead, 
which would make the customer $6 better off for that 
particular transaction and the merchant $4 better off. The 
customer would agree if the value it placed on Amex’s perks 
was less than the $6 price discount. 
The antisteering provision prevents this transaction from 
occurring, however. As a result, the customer stays with the 
Amex card and experiences a $6 loss. The merchant loses $4 
as well. So, far from being a situation where value goes up on 
one side and down on the other, it actually goes down on both 
sides. At the margin, both the cardholder side and the 
merchant side of the platform are losers. In addition, the 
competing platform, Visa, is also worse off because it was 
denied the opportunity to offer a lower cost substitute 
transaction. The only entity that is better off is Amex—the 
owner of the platform itself, but not the dealing parties on one 
 
187 See 13 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 2231 (3d ed. 2012). 
188 The analysis here relies on Hovenkamp, supra note 15, at 27. 
189 See, e.g., Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 
(1982) (discussing R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 
1 (1960)).  
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or the other side of the platform. It is better off because the 
Amex cardholder who would have switched did not place much 
value on the Amex perks, suggesting that margins on those 
sales would have been particularly high. The Amex 
cardholders most likely to switch are those that would benefit 
most from using a different card. 
As the district court observed, other Amex cardholders 
would decline the merchant’s offer to switch, because for them 
the value of the perks might be as high as the merchant’s 
acceptance fee, or at least as high as that portion of the fee 
that the merchant offered them for switching.190 Cardholders 
whose behavior was actually changed by the antisteering rule 
were worse off as a result of the rule, thus creating lost value 
on both sides of the platform.191 That is why, even if the 
market were irrationally defined as including both sides, the 
way the majority defined it,192 competitive harm was 
apparent: at the margin, cardholders, merchants, and rival 
platforms were all injured by an output-reducing restraint. 
Whom does the antisteering rule benefit in this case? Not 
the traders on either side of the platform, but only Amex itself, 
who is able to retain that transaction at margins in excess of 
 
190 United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 220 (E.D.N.Y. 
2015), rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express 
Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018) (“[E]ven if a merchant is inclined to steer away 
from American Express, the cardholder would still have the freedom to use 
an Amex card if the cardholder decides the rewards offered by American 
Express are of greater value than the discount, in-kind perk, or other benefit 
offered by the merchant.”). 
191 The Second Circuit stated the requirement as whether the 
antisteering rule “made all Amex consumers on both sides of the platform—
i.e., both merchants and cardholders—worse off over all.” United States v. 
Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 205 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. 
Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). The phrase “over all” is ambiguous, 
but it may imply the proper question, and the one that the government 
actually answered, which is that it made every affected merchant and 
cardholder worse off. For example, in an exclusive dealing case courts do 
not ask if every customer would have switched but for exclusive dealing, 
thus giving the defendant a market share of zero. Instead, the question is 
whether enough would have switched to create an inference of competitive 
harm. 
192 See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
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the value that these cardholders placed on use of the card. 
Amex benefits because its volume increases by that one 
transaction, but Visa loses that same transaction.193 One 
might be tempted to describe that shift as a wash, but in fact 
it is not. The shift to Visa, the preferred platform for both the 
cardholder and the merchant, would produce both higher 
cardholder and merchant value as well as higher output in the 
product market. To be sure, the loss of these transactions 
would cost Amex revenue and there would be feedback effects 
that would generate a new, and likely less profitable 
equilibrium for Amex, but that is what competition is all 
about. 
This is the point at which a possible defense would come 
in. One factor worth examining is whether preserving the 
transaction to Amex was necessary to the viability of its 
business model. And if so, does that provide a benefit to 
competition in excess of costs? For example, Amex might 
argue that it needs a certain minimum transaction volume 
coupled with higher prices in order to be profitable. First of 
all, this query does not depend on whether there is one market 
or two.194 Indeed, it does not even depend on the existence of 
a platform, but only on the existence of scale economies or 
other attributes relating profitability to scale. These are core 
issues in industrial organization. Second, the need to 
maintain viability while charging higher prices hardly sounds 
like a meritorious antitrust defense. 
Steering would permit the bargaining parties—i.e., 
merchants and customers—to negotiate to the joint 
maximizing position. Consumers who place a small value on 
Amex’s perks could use a different form of payment and would 
be better off. For their part, merchants could bargain by 
discounting the price, or offering collateral services such as 
free delivery, to reflect the merchant costs of a particular 
payment form. The important thing is that in the absence of 
transaction costs and under good information, everything 
 
193 See Hovenkamp, supra note 15, at 30–31. 
194 See id. at 25–27. 
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would get discounted into the purchase price.195 This becomes 
an important efficiency principle: payment systems should be 
“neutral” and transparent, permitting the parties to negotiate 
to a mutually beneficial maximum.196 The Amex antisteering 
rule was a bargaining impediment that prevented the 
payment platform’s own participants from reaching a joint-
maximizing deal. Moreover, in the process of injuring its own 
participants, it also excluded rival card platforms who were 
ready, willing, and able to offer better terms. Consequently, it 
resulted in higher product prices across the board.  
Looking at the situation as a whole, it seems clear that the 
district court and Justice Breyer got the issue right through a 
careful examination of the record. Stated in rule of reason 
terms, the question was whether the plaintiff had presented 
enough evidence of competitive harm to require the defendant 
to offer a defense. The harms were clear: cardholders were 
denied an opportunity to obtain a lower price, the merchants 
were denied the opportunity for a less costly transaction, and 
rival cards that were less costly lost sales. From a consumer 
welfare perspective, the directly affected consumers were 
worse off, as well as other consumers who were forced to pay 
higher product prices regardless of the form of payment they 
 
195 See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–16 
(1960). 
196 See Rochet & Tirole, supra note 15, at 648 (“Neutrality in payment 
systems. The choice of an interchange fee paid by the merchant’s bank, the 
acquirer, to the cardholder’s bank, the issuer, is irrelevant if the following 
conditions are jointly satisfied: First, issuers and acquirers pass through the 
corresponding charge (or benefit) to the cardholder and the merchant. 
Second, the merchant can charge two different prices for goods or services 
depending on whether the consumer pays by cash or by card; in other words, 
the payment system does not impose a no-surcharge rule as a condition for 
the merchant to be affiliated with the system. Third, the merchant and the 
consumer incur no transaction cost associated with a dual-price system.”). 
As Rochet and Tirole observe, the Coase Theorem indicates that in a well-
functioning market, merchants and customers would move to a wealth 
maximizing equilibrium. Id. at 649. But the minimum conditions are that 
the parties are free to bargain (i.e., no prohibition on steering) and that they 
have adequate information about the gains that would be available from 
trading. See id. 
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chose.197 While Amex itself was benefitted by preserving the 
transaction to its own system, this was at best a wealth 
transfer from whatever platform lost the transaction.198 In 
fact, the antisteering rule was not a neutral wealth transfer 
at all, but rather a transfer from a competing platform that 
generated higher value to one that generated lower value. As 
Justice Breyer noted in dissent, looking at the prima facie 
case, “there is little more that need be said.”199 
H. Implications for Market Definition 
Amex raises important issues concerning market definition 
in antitrust cases. As discussed above, grouping both sides of 
a platform into a single relevant market was economic 
nonsense and, in any event, unnecessary to the analysis that 
the Court undertook.200 Nevertheless, the law is what it is 
and, that leaves important questions about the scope of the 
decision’s holding. 
The Court held that not every two-sided platform qualified 
for its unique approach, but noted that transactional 
platforms in which there is a simultaneous one-to-one 
correspondence between the transactions on one side of the 
platform and those on the other side are “different.”201 Even 
this definition was too broad to be supported by some of the 
literature the majority cited.202 Further, it was apparently 
 
197 See supra notes 180–92 and accompanying text. 
198 See Hovenkamp, supra note 15, at 30. 
199 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2294 (2018) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
200 See supra notes 101–12 and accompanying text. 
201 See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2286 (requiring “a single, 
simultaneous transaction between participants”). 
202 As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent, see id. at 2300, the Court’s 
definition was broader than the definition given even in the economic 
literature that the majority opinion cited. For example, Rochet & Tirole, 
whom the majority relies on, say this: 
“Getting the two sides on board” is a useful characterization, 
but it is not restrictive enough. Indeed, if the analysis just 
stopped there, pretty much any market would be two-sided, 
since buyers and sellers need to be brought together for 
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driven by the Court’s mistaken view that in a transactional 
platform each gain on one side generates an equal-and-
offsetting benefit on the other side.203 
Nevertheless, under the majority’s approach the two sides 
of the Amex platform constitute a single relevant market 
because a $50 transaction on the consumer side of the Amex 
platform is simultaneously offset by a $50 transaction on the 
merchant side, less Amex’s acceptance fee. 
Upon first glance, Uber would appear to be another 
instance of a pure transaction platform under this approach. 
Each ride that a passenger purchases generates a 
corresponding and simultaneous payment to the driver, less 
the fee. Interbank ATM platforms are very likely in the same 
category. The same may also be true of airline and hotel 
reservation websites, such as Orbitz and Expedia, and 
perhaps of venue websites such as Ticketmaster.204 All of 
these cases, however, will depend on a careful evaluation of 
the facts. 
The Court also observed that other types of platforms 
exhibit a looser relationship between transactions on one side 
and those on the other, and these would not fall within the 
Court’s “single market” rule. It noted sales of newspapers and 
 
markets to exist and gains from trade to be realized. We 
define a two-sided market as one in which the volume of 
transactions between end-users depends on the structure 
and not only on the overall level of the fees charged by the 
platform. A platform’s usage or variable charges impact the 
two sides’ willingness to trade once on the platform and, 
thereby, their net surpluses from potential interactions; the 
platforms’ membership or fixed charges in turn condition 
the end-users’ presence on the platform. The platforms’ fine 
design of the structure of variable and fixed charges is 
relevant only if the two sides do not negotiate away the 
corresponding usage and membership externalities. 
Rochet & Tirole, supra note 15, at 646. 
203 See supra notes 188–93 and accompanying text. 
204 See, e.g., Brief of US Airways at 2, US Airways, Inc. v. Sabre 
Holdings Corp., No. 17-960(L) & 17-983(XAP), 2018 WL 3456163, (2d Cir. 
July 16, 2018) (considering whether airline Global Distribution System 
(GDS) for travel agents, which facilitates ticket transactions, is a qualifying 
single market under Amex). 
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advertising, where the relationship is more attenuated.205 
That would also be the case for most magazines. It is also true 
of computer search engines, advertiser-supported music 
streaming, and other advertiser-supported services. For 
these, there is no balanced one-to-one transaction between the 
two sides. Other pay websites that do not exhibit one-to-one 
relationships include services such as Netflix, Amazon Prime 
Video, and Hulu. For these, subscribers typically pay a 
regular monthly fee after which the incremental cost of 
content is free. Therefore, there is neither simultaneity nor a 
very close correspondence between the size of the fee and the 
volume of content that the viewer can access.206 For example, 
a Netflix subscriber pays $8.99 a month for a basic 
subscription whether she watches one movie during that time 
period or a dozen.207 Amazon Prime Video is a little more 
complex because it concurrently offers “Prime” movies at an 
incremental price of zero and also pay movies, for which 
Amazon collects an individual fee, say $3.99, from 
customers.208 
There is an additional problem with movie and music 
streaming, however, which is that the platform operator itself 
is often the seller or licensor. Both Netflix and Amazon, as 
well as the music streamers, typically obtain nonexclusive 
licenses to the content that they stream, often in fixed-cost 
license agreements.209 As a result, they are not acting as a 
 
205 See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2286. 
206 For example, all Netflix plans offer unlimited viewing of Netflix 
content for a single monthly fee. See Choose Your Plan, NETFLIX, 
https://www.netflix.com/signup/planform (on file with the Columbia 
Business Law Review). 
207 See Choose a Plan That’s Right for You, NETFLIX, 
https://www.netflix.com/signup/planform (on file with the Columbia 
Business Law Review). 
208 See Andy Beatman, What Is Prime Video? – Amazon Prime Insider, 
AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/primeinsider/video/prime-video-qa.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y5B9-LYDF] (describing both “Prime” content and rental 
content). 
209 See Erik Hovenkamp & Neel U. Sukhatme, Vertical Mergers and 
the MFN Thicket in Television, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Aug. 2018, at 4, 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads 
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platform intermediary between the movie’s owner and the 
customer. Having acquired a nonexclusive license at a fixed 
fee that permits relicensing, Netflix or Amazon are 
themselves the sellers, so there are not two sides of the market 
to define but only a seller on one side and a buyer on the other 
side, as with any market. This is a critical distinction. The 
premise in a case such as Amex is that the merchant is selling 
its own product and the customer is buying it. Amex is only 
the platform intermediary facilitating the transaction. The 
merchant does not sell the product to Amex, who then in turn 
sells it to the customer. The same is true of Uber: Drivers do 
not sell rides to Uber, which in turn sells them to passengers. 
The Amex majority’s approach does not apply when the 
merchandise is actually sold or licensed to the operator of the 
platform. 
By the same token, to the extent that Amazon, Walmart, 
Target, or numerous other retailers purchase goods from 
manufacturers and then sell them on their websites, the 
platform operator is not merely a transaction facilitator. 
Therefore, the established economics of market definition 
should apply in those cases. If websites such as Orbitz and 
Expedia purchase blocks of rooms for resale, or if 
Ticketmaster purchases a block of tickets for a particular 
performance, those transactions do not qualify for Amex’s 
market definition approach either. Likewise, in a blanket 
license case such as BMI, the artist provides BMI with a non-
exclusive license and subsequently BMI sells a blanket license 
to a radio station.210 There is neither simultaneity nor a one-
to-one transactional correspondence. 
The status of app stores on smartphones may become 
relevant in consideration of Apple, Inc. v. Pepper, which the 
 
/2018/08/CPI-Hovenkamp-Sukhatme.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SBK-RTH7]. 
Under fixed-cost license agreements the licensee, such as Netflix, pays a 
one-time fee for a nonexclusive license to a film for a given time period, but 
does not pay a per use fee. See id. 
210 See Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 4 (1979); see also 
supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. 
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Supreme Court will soon address.211 The issue is whether 
customers who purchase apps for their iPhones or other Apple 
devices through Apple’s App Store, are direct purchasers from 
Apple. Assuming that the app producers are the violators, the 
underlying legal question is whether the app platform is a 
mere broker between the app producer and the consumer, or 
a purchaser-reseller. If the latter, the indirect purchaser rule 
barring damages actions to indirect purchasers applies.212 A 
question pertinent to Amex that is not necessarily governed 
by Illinois Brick is whether the transactions were 
“simultaneous,” as Amex requires. For instance, the app 
producer may have licensed and delivered its app to Apple in 
advance, which held them in its own cloud or storage devices, 
delivering them to a customer upon order. Under that 
scenario, the developer sold (licensed) the app to Apple, which 
held it until a later time when a customer bought (licensed) a 
copy.213 One important principle is that Amex does not provide 
a basis for turning ordinary vertical distribution into a single 
market at both the upstream and downstream levels. Many of 
the economic effects commonly attributed to platforms are 
similar to those that result from ordinary vertical 
distribution.214 
There are also intermediate platforms where the relation 
between transactions on one side of the platform and those on 
the other side is not one-to-one and, in most cases, not 
simultaneous either. A prominent example is health 
 
211 See In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 313 (9th Cir. 2017), 
cert. granted sub. nom. Apple, Inc. v. Pepper, 138 S. Ct. 2647 (2018); see also 
Salveson v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 663 F. App’x 71 (2d Cir. 2016); In re 
Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 05-MD-
1720, 2018 WL 4158290, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2018) (noting possible 
relevance of Amex to decision considering whether credit cardholders were 
indirect purchasers from issuing banks). 
212 See Ill. Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730–31 (1977); see also 2A 
PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ROGER D. BLAIR & CHRISTINE 
PIETTE DURRANCE, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 346 (4th ed. 2014). 
213 Apple’s position on the issue is articulated in a brief to the Supreme 
Court. See Brief of Petitioner at 2–3, In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 138 
S. Ct. 2647 (No. 17-204). 
214 On this point, see Carlton & Winter, supra note 17, at 215. 
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insurance networks. On one side is the insured patient, who 
receives a covered medical procedure. On the other side is a 
health care provider. In the middle is the platform, which is 
an insurer who collects premiums from the insured or her 
employer and pays the provider’s claim.215 Here, however, the 
sales to insured are neither simultaneous nor are they made 
on a matching fee-for-service basis. 
Actually, the arrangement that the Supreme Court 
condemned under the per se rule in its Arizona v. Maricopa 
County Medical Society216 decision looks a little more like a 
two-sided platform as the Amex opinion defined it. In that 
case, physician participants agreed to be compensated at 
stipulated fees per service, which were paid by the insured or, 
more likely, an employer.217 Even this arrangement would not 
meet the Amex definition unless payment and receipt were 
simultaneous. In any event, since Maricopa condemned such 
arrangements, insurers have taken a more actuarial approach 
that requires providers to share a certain amount of risk.218 
The Maricopa decision itself contemplated that result, 
suggesting that firms that “pool their capital and share the 
risks of loss as well as the opportunities for profit” be treated 
more like an integrated single entity.219 
In the modern health insurance network, characterized by 
risk sharing and actuarial pricing, it clearly is not the case 
that the platform “facilitate[s] a single, simultaneous 
 
215 One decision that discussed the then-pending Amex decision 
involved a horizontal territorial division and price-fixing agreement among 
Blue Cross affiliates is In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litig., 308 F. 
Supp. 3d 1241, 1276 n.20 (N.D. Ala. 2018); see also Lifewatch Servs. Inc. v. 
Highmark Inc., 902 F.3d 323, 337 (3d Cir. 2018), which mentioned the 
possible relevance of Amex to a market definition question in a health 
insurance market, but did not decide the case on that basis. 
216 See Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982). 
217 Id. at 339–40. 
218 See Scott D. Danzis, Revising the Revised Guidelines: Incentives, 
Clinically Integrated Physician Networks, and the Antitrust Laws, 87 VA. L. 
REV. 531, 531–44 (2001); Thomas L. Greaney, Managed Competition, 
Integrated Delivery Systems and Antitrust, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1530 
(1994). 
219 Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 356. 
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transaction between participants[,]” as the Supreme Court 
required.220 The insurer might receive a premium of, say, 
$500 per month from the insured and pay the insured’s 
medical expenses for that month, less any deductibles, copays, 
and the like. The insurer’s payment could be greater or 
smaller than $500 depending on the insured’s needs. To be 
sure, there is often a co-payment, such as a flat fee per office 
visit. However, this co-payment is often not made to the 
insurer at all, but rather directly to the health care provider. 
In that case the network is not acting as an intermediary. 
Once again, there is no substitute for careful examination of a 
record. 
Suppose that an insurer network enters an exclusive 
agreement with a provider, effectively denying that provider 
the ability to service other networks or health payment 
systems. Ordinary exclusive dealing principles might require 
foreclosure on the order of, say, thirty percent for a prima facie 
case.221 This might require that both a provider market and a 
consumer market be defined, but it would not require 
anything as economically incoherent as putting them into the 
same market.222 In response, the defense might be raised that 
the network provider needs exclusive dealing with, say, 
anesthesiologists in order to make its network economically 
viable, but that is a question that can largely be answered 
independently of network considerations. 
Other platforms not included in Amex’s “single market” 
definition include intermediaries that bring buyers and 
sellers together but have little to do with the resulting 
transaction. For example, real estate websites such as 
realtor.com and Zillow.com identify real properties that are 
for sale or rent. Having settled on a property, a prospective 
purchaser then contacts the broker by email or telephone and, 
after subsequent negotiations, there may be a sale. But none 
of this comes close to the kind of simultaneous one-to-one 
 
220 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2286 (2018). 
221 See 11 HOVENKAMP, supra note 117 ¶ 1821c (discussing foreclosure 
percentages and suggesting a minimum in the range of thirty percent). 
222 See supra notes 122–26 and accompanying text. 
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transaction that was present in Amex. The same thing is 
largely true of dating websites such as Match.com or 
OkCupid.com. Typically, members on both sides pay a 
monthly or annual fee, although some sites also offer free 
versions. As in the case of real estate sites, however, the 
website does little more than introduce two people to each 
other. What, if anything, happens later occurs largely off the 
site. At first glance, Craigslist appears to resemble these sites 
more than, say, eBay, which actually completes transactions 
on the site. On Craigslist, offerors of merchandise or services 
essentially post an advertisement with contact information, 
but prospective purchasers typically make their contact and 
any subsequent transaction off the site. 
The same thing appears to be true of the NCAA, which may 
be a multi-sided platform that, according to one expert, brings 
together students, student athletes, alumni, coaches and 
athletic staff.223 Factually, this may be true, but that will not 
satisfy the definition of a single two-sided relevant market for 
antitrust purposes unless someone can show the requisite 
simultaneous one-to-one transaction between both sides. 
There are certainly other examples, but the important 
point is that only a relatively small subset of two-sided 
platforms fall within the Court’s requirements for treating the 
two sides as a single market. On this question, maintaining a 
coherent economic approach to antitrust policy requires that 
Amex be limited to its facts. In any event, the Supreme Court 
was clear that the two sides should not be treated as a single 
market unless they were characterized by “transactions” that 
were both “simultaneous” and one-to-one.224 
IV. CONCLUSION 
One danger of the Amex decision is its signal that neither 
close economic analysis nor careful examination of the record 
is necessary to apply antitrust law under the rule of reason. 
That, of course, flies in the face of a century-long history of 
 
223 See In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., No. 14-
md-02541 CW, 2018 WL 4241981, at *4 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 3, 2018). 
224 Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2286. 
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rule of reason analysis in the federal courts, which has always 
emphasized careful examination of a well-developed record on 
issues pertaining to both power and conduct.225 Judge William 
Howard Taft himself distinguished ancillary from naked 
restraints only by careful examination of the facts.226 
The Amex majority never concluded that the district court’s 
fact findings were an abuse of discretion or otherwise 
improper. Rather, it simply ignored them. Nor did it declare 
as a matter of law that close examination of a factual record 
is unimportant in antitrust cases under the rule of reason. As 
a result, the lower federal courts should not feel precluded 
from engaging in the kind of close transactional analysis that 
the rule of reason traditionally requires if decisions are to be 
economically coherent. 
The economic literature on two-sided platforms has made 
major contributions to price and industrial organization 
theory in a wide variety of markets. It deserves an important 
position in both industrial economics and competition policy. 
At the same time, however, its influence should not be 
exaggerated. It is, essentially, a tool of neoclassical economics, 
not a discovery that realistically threatens to alter the 
foundations of economics. 
The two-sided-platform literature is strongly reminiscent 
of another development in the theory of industrial 
organization thirty years ago. That theory, termed 
“contestable markets,” grew out of the imminently reasonable 
observation that where a market contains only one seller, 
competition “for the market” can yield competitive outcomes 
just as much as competition by multiple incumbents “in the 
market.”227 The theory of contestable markets was introduced 
 
225 See Hovenkamp, supra note 99, at 101–02. 
226 See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280–83 
(6th Cir. 1898), modified and aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
227 On the initial debate, see generally Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate 
Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968) and Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise 
Bidding for Natural Monopolies—In General and With Respect to CATV, 7 
BELL J. ECON. 73 (1976). For a reprise, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulation 
and the Marginalist Revolution, FLA. L. REV (forthcoming 2019), 
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by prominent economists with great fanfare, producing a 
spate of articles and at least one important book.228 The late 
William J. Baumol, a past president of the American 
Economic Association, proclaimed it to be an “uprising” in the 
theory of industry structure.229 It promised to eliminate the 
need for such things as public utility or airline regulation 
because even a natural monopolist incumbent knew that the 
instant it attempted to charge too high a price a potential rival 
would swoop in and steal the business. 
But the theory never lived up to anything remotely 
resembling its expectations, although it did provide some 
valuable lessons. Even in the airline industry, thought to be a 
prime target for contestability, competition among incumbent 
carriers remains an important determinant of price and 
output. The theory of platform markets will pursue much the 
same course. After a brief period of exaggeration, industrial 
organization theory will be enriched, but will remain 
fundamentally the same. The Amex majority opinion serves to 
highlight what happens when a Court abandons fundamental 
economics in its haste to encounter something new. 
The decision that seems to come closest to Amex as an 
economic “misfire” is the Supreme Court’s 1992 ruling in 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, in which the 
Court held that sufficient power to condemn a tie of parts and 
service by a nondominant firm could be inferred from 
consumer “lock in.”230 Kodak was a six to three decision, but 
the reaction to Kodak was so strongly critical that subsequent 
lower court decisions went to great lengths to limit it.231 It has 
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had little impact on antitrust outcomes even though lock-in is 
more prevalent today in our modern networked world than it 
was in 1992. 
Other consequences could be on the horizon. This decision 
will encourage more legislation and regulation as more 
decision makers lose confidence in judge-made antitrust rules 
to promote competition. As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent, 
several jurisdictions around the world have acted against high 
interchange fees and antisteering rules, mostly by statute or 
agency rule.232 The United States legal system has 
historically relied less on regulation and more on antitrust 
law, which can be much less intrusive. But what this decision 
describes as “steering” is actually among the most ordinary 
and essential of competitive functions: encouraging people to 
acquire information and giving them the option to choose. 
This process protects the competitive process, both improving 
product quality and driving prices to the competitive level. For 
example, a common concern about healthcare costs is that 
they are so high because patients are indifferent to prices. 
First, medical bills are paid indirectly by insurers. Second, 
most patients do not even pay the insurance premium; rather, 
it is paid by either an employer or a government agency. As a 
result, the patient bears only a small portion of the cost and is 
inclined to spend too much. The antisteering rule operates in 
much the same way: it makes the cardholder indifferent to 
merchant costs and thus diminishes the consumer incentive 
to reduce them. 
Today, the consumer welfare principle in antitrust is under 
attack from people who argue for abandonment of economic 
approaches to antitrust in favor of populism, political theory, 
or some other source.233 Decisions like Amex add fuel to their 
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cause. The success of antitrust as an enterprise driven by 
economic policy depends on the ability and willingness of 
judges to use economics effectively, bringing monopoly prices 
and output restrictions under control while protecting 
provable efficiencies. The rule of reason cannot be simply an 
excuse for judges to ignore well developed records and sound 
economic theory in order to reach a conclusion that they find 
pleasing on noneconomic grounds. 
 
